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I. INTRODUCTION
New technologies and methods of surveillance widely change the
impact of constitutional rights in society. First, the United States Supreme
Court addressed telephonic surveillance.1 Then, the Supreme Court
addressed the developments of technologies such as airplane surveillance,2
thermal imaging,3 and global positioning system (GPS) surveillance.4
Now, there is video and pole camera surveillance.
Video surveillance does not ordinarily present constitutional or
statutory problems. It is a longstanding principle that a reasonable
expectation of privacy does not exist when there is voluntary exposure of
a defendant’s actions to third parties.5 But, issues with video surveillance
typically arise where there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
attached to the area being monitored.
The Supreme Court has not been completely silent as to the general
topic of video surveillance. In United States v. Katz, the Court developed
a non-statutory analysis to govern recording electronic surveillance.6 The
relevant federal statutes that govern the interception of wire, oral, and
electronic communication are silent as to video-only7 camera

1

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213
(1986).
3 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
4 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
5 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding no privacy interest in
telephone numbers dialed); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1971) (finding
no privacy interest in what someone voluntarily reveals to a false friend).
6 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361–62; see also United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994)
(discussing an apartment interior); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (discussing a business office interior); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911
F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing a warehouse-like building interior); United States
v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing a backyard); United States v.
Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986 (discussing a private business office); United States
v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing a terrorist safehouse); Cf. United States
v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3rd Cir. 1997) (discussing an office interior).
7 M. Wesley Clark, Pole Cameras and Surreptitious Surveillance, FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Nov. 2009, at 23.
2
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surveillance.8 Therefore, the critical question in the analysis is whether a
person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.9
If a reasonable expectation of privacy is found to exist, then the
Fourth Amendment typically requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant
unless an exception applies.10 Conversely, if a reasonable expectation of
privacy is not found to exist, then the Fourth Amendment does not apply.11
In general, law enforcement’s observations of a person’s “comings and
goings,” occurring outside of a dwelling or within a curtilage, do not
amount to a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.12
One of the most common types of video surveillance methods is the
pole camera. Law enforcement utilizes pole cameras in circumstances
when it is operationally impractical to conduct physical surveillance or
where suspects engage in counter-surveillance.13 The view from a pole
camera is arguably “nothing more than a utility worker would have if he
was performing job-related duties atop the pole.”14 Law enforcement can
affix pole cameras with the consent of the utility company and without a
court order permitting installation to monitor a specific area, also known
as an “installation or authorizing monitoring order.”15
Provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act provide statutory guidance for
certain types of communications. Specifically, Title III provides the
statutory framework that governs real-time electronic surveillance of the
contents of communications.16 Title III is currently inapplicable to video
surveillance.17 Nevertheless, a majority of the federal circuit courts have
construed some of the Title III requirements to apply to video surveillance
warrants.18 But, there needs to be consistent uniformity throughout the
Circuit Courts of Appeals with a constitutional issue of this magnitude.
In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court confronted the question
of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated by a warrantless aerial
observation from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in backyard within
8

See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2015); 50 U.S.C. §1801 et seq. (2015).
Clark, supra, note 7, at 24.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235–36 (1986) (noting that Fourth
Amendment protection can and do reach commercial establishments).
13 Clark, supra, note 7, at 23.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
17 United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984).
18 United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994); Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 542;
United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. CuevasSanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.
1986; Torres, 751 F.2d 875; Cf. United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3rd Cir. 1997).
9
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the curtilage of a home.19 The Court ultimately held that the Fourth
Amendment was not violated because the defendant held an expectation
of privacy that society was unwilling to recognize.20 As a result, the
Circuit Courts of Appeals have interpreted Ciraolo differently in
determining whether a search warrant is required to conduct pole camera
surveillance in the vicinity of a defendant’s residence.
The Fifth Circuit has examined the issue of pole camera surveillance
of backyards as a matter of first impression.21 The Fifth Circuit narrowly
applied Ciraolo, holding that curtilage, deliberately protected from
observation by ordinary passersby, requires a warrant for video
surveillance.22 Although not directly opposing the Fifth Circuit’s stance,
the Tenth Circuit has held that warrantless pole camera surveillance from
a pole camera does not violate the Fourth Amendment where there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy, since the cameras are capable of
observing what any passerby would easily be able to observe.23
It is necessary for the courts to broadly interpret Ciraolo when
applying the decision to video surveillance. This Comment suggests that
a broad interpretation of Ciraolo not only comports with the analysis of
similar technological advancements, but also produces the same result
under both trespass and privacy theories. The consensus among various
circuit courts is that video surveillance does not violate the Fourth
Amendment as long as law enforcement follows the four requirements of
Title III, as well as the ordinary requirement of a finding of probable cause,
despite the fact that Title III does not explicitly cover video surveillance.
Additionally, the legislature should amend Title III to encompass video
surveillance, thereby providing a more definitive analysis and creating
uniformity within the federal circuit courts. If, however, the legislature
does not amend Title III, a majority of the circuit courts holdings suggest
that the Fourth Amendment analysis should be applied.
In developing this argument, Part II of this Comment sets forth an
overview of Fourth Amendment searches, as well as the relationship
between the Fourth Amendment and video surveillance. Part III examines
the current state of the law with regard to video surveillance. Part IV
analyzes constitutional and statutory concerns, as well as policy
considerations. Finally, Part V reiterates why the broad interpretation of

19

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1985).
Id. at 212–14.
21 Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 250–52.
22 Id.
23 United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated on other
grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000).
20
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Ciraolo must be followed and why Title III must be amended to produce
consistency within the lower courts.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview of Fourth Amendment Searches
While the text of the Fourth Amendment has remained the same,
technologies have progressed beyond the Founding Fathers’ wildest
dreams. The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”24 Probable cause is necessary for a warrant to be
issued, and it must be “supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”25 Case law has clarified that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless a specific exception,
such as exigent circumstances or consent, applies.26
The Founding Fathers created the Fourth Amendment as a response
to British search and seizure practices, in particular the use of writs of
assistance, which allotted broad latitude to customs officials to search
houses, shops, cellars, warehouses, and other places for smuggled items.27
Early Americans challenged this practice as “plac[ing] the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer.”28 Additionally, early Americans
were concerned with the privacy of the home and the possibility of abuse
by government officials, which would result in oppression.29
The Supreme Court established some guidelines in order to clarify
one’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” in Katz v. United States.30 The
two-part inquiry established in Katz examines (1) whether the individual
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged scope and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable.31 Therefore, “what a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office” does not trigger Fourth

24

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
26 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)).
27 M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief
that Gave it Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 907–09 (2010).
28 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
29 Id.
30 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
31 Id. at 361.
25

2015]

Searches and Seizures

119

Amendment protection.32 Furthermore, it is permissible for law
enforcement to utilize its resources to conduct surveillance where it has a
legal right to occupy without a warrant.33
There are three categorical areas examined when confronted with
Fourth Amendment issues. These areas include the home, curtilage, and
open fields.34 The sanctity of the home is expressly protected within the
text of the Fourth Amendment and has been repeatedly recognized in case
law.35 The Supreme Court has defined curtilage as the area that
immediately surrounds or is adjacent to the home, which the activity of the
home life extends.36 The Court has afforded curtilage similar protection
to the home since it is “sufficiently intimate” that it is related and protected
as if it were part of a person’s residence.37 In determining whether
surrounding property is “sufficiently intimate,” the Court identified four
factors to be considered, which include (1) the closeness of the area in
question to the home; (2) whether this area is within an enclosure
surrounding the dwelling; (3) the manner in which the area is used; and
(4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
passersby.38 The Court noted that no one factor is determinative, and not
all four factors have to be present before a person is able to conclude that
an area under consideration is to be considered curtilage.39
Lastly, there is the area of open fields, which is the area that extends
beyond the curtilage. Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to
open fields areas. Unlike the home, open fields “do not provide the setting
for those intimate activities” that the Fourth Amendment protects.40 Thus,
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy that attaches to open fields.41
Notwithstanding the three categorical areas, the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit law enforcement from “augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and

32

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361–62.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213)
(“[T]he police may see what may be seen ‘from a public vantage point where [they have]
a right to be[.]’”); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978)
(“Permissible techniques of surveillance include more than the five senses of officers and
their unaided physical abilities.”).
34 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
35 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (citing Payton v. New
York, 455 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961);
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
36 This is prototypically the backyard or porch area.
37 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
41 Id.
33
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technology afforded them.”42 In applying this concept, the Ninth Circuit
has permitted law enforcement to use photographic equipment to gather
evidence.43 Notably, the Ninth Circuit characterized the technique as “a
prudent and efficient use of modern technology.”44 As will further be
discussed later in this Section, there are parameters to this type of
surveillance.45
B. The Fourth Amendment as Applied to Technological
Advancements in Surveillance Methods
Over the years, the Supreme Court has confronted technological
advancements with regard to law enforcement surveillance methods. The
Court clarified the “right to privacy” and defined a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States.46 In the years following Katz,
the Court discussed other methods of surveillance, such as aerial
surveillance, thermal imaging surveillance, global positioning system
(“GPS”) surveillance, and electronic tracking.47 The Court undoubtedly
needs to address other technological advancements, such as drones used
by law enforcement for surveillance purposes, in the future.
1. Telephonic Surveillance
In Katz, the Supreme Court addressed the concept of the “right to
privacy” and what constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.48
The FBI utilized an electronic eavesdropping device to record the
defendant’s phone calls made via a public pay phone.49 The nature of
defendant’s calls involved transmitting illegal gambling wagers.50 The
Court ultimately found that the government’s activities in electronically
listening to and recording the defendant violated his reasonable
expectation of privacy and constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment.51

42

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999).
44 Id.
45 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (prohibiting the use of thermal
imaging surveillance without a warrant).
46 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
47 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (discussing aerial surveillance); Florida
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (discussing aerial surveillance); Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27
(discussing thermal imaging surveillance); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
(discussing GPS surveillance).
48 Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
49 Id. at 348.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 359.
43
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Importantly, the Court abandoned the trespass theory and adopted
the privacy theory in Katz. Justice Harlan, writing for the concurrence,
established a two-part test, with the underlying theory that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people not places.” 52 The two-part test for
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists includes
examining whether (1) the individual “has exhibited an actual expectation
of privacy,” and (2) whether society is prepared to recognize that this
expectation is reasonable.”53 Thus, this analysis is both subjective and
objective.
2. Aerial Surveillance
In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether naked-eye aerial observation without a warrant from an altitude
of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a home was
permissible under the United States Constitution.54 Police utilized an
airplane from an altitude of 1,000 feet to observe a fenced-in backyard
within the curtilage of defendant’s home.55 The police did not use sensory
enhancing technology, but instead, their own eyes.56 Ultimately, the Court
held that this type of naked-eye aerial observation did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.57
The Court engaged in the two-part Katz analysis, and noted that the
fence served the purpose of concealing the marijuana crop because the
“defendant took normal precautions to maintain his privacy,” specifically
by using “a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence.”58 The Court
found that it was inconclusive whether defendant manifested a “subjective
expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard” or “whether
instead he manifested merely a hope that no one would observe his
unlawful gardening pursuits . . . ”59 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
ten foot fence “might not [have] shield[ed] these plants from the eyes of a
citizen or policeman perched on top of a truck or a two-level bus.”60
As to the second part of the analysis under Katz, the Court concluded
that defendant’s expectation that his marijuana garden was protected from
such observation was not recognized by society as a reasonable

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 361–62 (emphasis added).
Id.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986).
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 213–15.
Id. at 209–211.
Id. at 211–12.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211–12.
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expectation of privacy.61 Specifically, the Court emphasized that the
Fourth Amendment does not require police to obtain a warrant “in order
to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”62
Shortly after Ciraolo was decided, the Court again addressed the
question of aerial surveillance in Florida v. Riley.63 In Riley, the Court
considered whether observation of the interior of a greenhouse within the
curtilage of a residence from a helicopter 400 feet above was a search that
required a warrant.64 While the overhead flight observation in Riley was
more intrusive compared to Ciraolo, and surely less stealthy, a plurality of
the Court held that the surveillance did not violate defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights because the helicopter complied with aviation
regulations.65 The Court noted that “intimate details” which were
connected with the use of the home or the curtilage were not observed.66
Because members of the public could have legally taken the exact
helicopter ride 400 feet above the defendant’s home and witness
defendant’s “illegal horticultural display,” the police were also permitted
to do so.67
But the use of an airplane or helicopter to surveil suspects is not
necessarily a “free pass” for law enforcement. The Court has recently
clarified that visual observation of the home from public navigable
airspace must be “done in a physically nonintrusive manner.”68 In Florida
v. Jardines, the Court distinguished a physically intrusive dog sniff search
from visual aerial surveillance.69 Thus, the concern seems to be regarding
investigative methods that are physically intrusive, rather than easily
observable.
3. Thermal Imaging Surveillance
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless
use of a thermal imaging device to reveal the relative amount of heat
released from the various rooms of a defendant’s home amounted to search
that violated the Fourth Amendment.70 The Court held that the
surveillance rose to the level of a “search.”71 The Court found that this
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 213–15.
Id. at 215.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445.
Riley, 488 U.S. at 447–49.
Id. at 450–52.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 451; see also Clark, supra, note 7 at 28.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1415–17.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 34–35.
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type of search is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant where law
enforcement explores intimate details of the home, which could be
determined without a physical intrusion via a device that is not in general
public use.72
Whether a technology falls within the scope of the Kyllo rule depends
on at least two factors. First, in order for the Kyllo rule to apply, the
technology must not be in “general public use.”73 In addition, the Kyllo
rule applies to the technology that reveals information about the interior
of the home.74
Defendants have attempted to invoke the Kyllo rule in cases where
the government used cell tower information or an electronic device to
locate a cell phone.75 Specifically, a district court in the Seventh Circuit
rejected a Kyllo challenge to the use of an electronic device to locate a cell
phone because cell phones transmit signals to parties outside a home.76
The district court reasoned that the cell phone signals were knowingly
exposed to the third-party cell phone company.77 Under federal law, there
is no expectation of privacy in pieces of data that are voluntarily disclosed
to a third party.78
4. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) Surveillance and Electronic
Tracking
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment is not
violated when law enforcement monitors a beeper without a warrant,
revealing information that could have been obtained through visual
surveillance.79 But the recent decision in United States v. Jones has altered
the landscape for electronic tracking. In Jones, federal law enforcement
officers attached a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle, without a valid
warrant, and pinpointed the vehicle’s movements to within fifty to one
72

Id. at 40.
Id.
74 Id. (“We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to
the house.” (emphasis added) (quoting Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
75 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic
Evidence in Criminal Investigations 15 (2009).
76 United States v. Bermudez, 2006 WL 3197181 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006), aff’d 509
F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007).
77 Id.
78 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding no privacy interest in
telephone numbers dialed).
79 Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (monitoring of a beeper does
not violate the Fourth Amendment when it reveals no information that could not have been
obtained through visual surveillance) with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)
(monitoring of a beeper violates the Fourth Amendment when it reveals information that
could not have been obtained through visual surveillance, and a warrant is required).
73
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hundred feet for approximately one month.80 The Court held that the
physical intrusion of a GPS device on a vehicle constituted a Fourth
Amendment search and thus required a search warrant.81
The parties argued solely on privacy theory grounds, as opposed to
trespass theory, because it simply was not utilized since Katz in 1967.
While the Court unanimously agreed that a search occurred, the Court was
divided over analyzing the case under trespass and privacy theories.82 The
prevailing concern was that if law enforcement monitored a person over a
long period of time, non-criminal information could be learned about
them.83 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, based the opinion on trespass
grounds, and distinguished law enforcement’s actions here with attaching
a listening device to a phone booth.84 Justice Scalia reasoned that in order
to attach the GPS device to the undercarriage of the vehicle, law
enforcement must invade the physicality of the vehicle, thus obviously
resulting in a physical intrusion.85
C. Relevant Federal Wiretap Statutes Which are Applicable Only to
Oral, Wire, and Electronic Communications
Federal wiretap statutes govern three kinds of communications –
wire, oral, and electronic.86 Wire communications are defined as:
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin
and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in
a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged
in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of
interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting
interstate or foreign commerce.87

The most important requirement is the human voice.88 If a human
voice is not contained within a communication, then it is not considered to
be a wire communication.89 Oral communications are defined as “any oral
80

United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
Id. at 949.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 950.
85 Id. at 949.
86 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.
87 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
88 Judish, supra, note 69, at 162; see also § 2510(18) (defining “aural transfer” as a
“transfer containing the human voice any point between and including the point of origin
and the point of reception”).
89 Id. at 162–63.
81
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communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic
communication.”90
Lastly, electronic communications are defined in a “broad, catch-all”
category, as:
[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sound, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system
that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include –
(A) any wire or oral communication; (B) any communication
made through a tone-only paging device; (C) any communication
from a tracking device . . . or (D) electronic funds transfer
information stored by a financial institution in a communications
system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.91

Obtaining electronic communication data and electronic surveillance
in general raise the most legal issues. Two statutes primarily govern realtime electronic surveillance in federal criminal investigations. The
Wiretap Statute (“Title III”)92 and the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace
Devices statute (“Pen/Trap”)93 regulate access to different types of
information. Title III permits the government to obtain the contents of
wire and electronic communications in transmission.94 The questions that
agents and prosecutors must ask to ensure compliance with Title III are
relatively straightforward:
(1) Is the communication to be monitored one of the protected
communications defined in 18 U.S.C. §2510?
(2) Will the proposed surveillance lead to an “interception” of the
communications?
(3) If the answer to the first two questions is “yes,” does a statutory
exception apply that permits the interception?95

In contrast, the Pen/Trap Statute is concerned with the real-time
collection of addressing and other non-content information relating to

90
91
92
93
94
95

18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.
18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2015).
18 U.S.C. § 2513 (2015).
Judish, supra, note 69, at 161–62.
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those communications.96 The Pen/Trap Statute is inapplicable to this
Comment.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Fourth Amendment Concerns – Interpreting California v.
Ciraolo
1. The Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, law enforcement suspected that
drug traffickers were using the defendant’s property.97 Based upon their
suspicions, federal law enforcement officers obtained a court order before
installing a pole camera on defendant’s property.98 The pole camera
enabled law enforcement to “peer over” a ten-foot high fence at the back
of the defendant’s yard within the curtilage.99 The court order relied upon
an “extensive affidavit,” and the application “explained that conventional
law enforcement techniques, although attempted, had failed to uncover
enough evidence to convict the drug traffickers.”100 The order limited the
initial surveillance period to thirty days, mandated minimization, and
directed law enforcement to discontinue the surveillance when the
suspected participants were not on the premises.101
The Fifth Circuit held that the defendant had exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy by virtue of the fence that “screen[ed] the activity
from casual observers.”102 The court also noted that the area which the
pole camera surveilled amounted to “the curtilage of his home an area
protected by traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.”103 The Fifth Circuit
characterized pole camera surveillance as “provok[ing] an immediate
negative visceral reaction” after viewing it as “indiscriminate video
surveillance that raises the spectre of an Orwellian state.”104
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Ciraolo, noting that the intrusion was
not minimal, or a “one-time overhead flight or glance over the fence by a
96 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(h)(i) (stating that usage of pen registers or trap and trace
devices does not violate Title III); see generally United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227
F.3d 450, 453–54 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (contrasting pen registers and Title III intercept
devices); Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 289–94 (4th Cir. 1995) (contrasting pen registers
and Title III intercept devices).
97 United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987).
98 Id. at 250.
99 Id. at 251.
100 Id. at 250.
101 Id. at 249–50.
102 Id. at 251.
103 Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 251.
104 Id.
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passerby.”105 Instead, the pole camera at issue allowed law enforcement
to record “all activity” in the defendant’s backyard.106 Accordingly, the
court interpreted Ciraolo as not “authorizing any type of surveillance
whatever just because one type of minimally intrusive aerial observation
is possible.”107
The Fifth Circuit established that certain prerequisites were
necessary for a video surveillance order in “circumstances where a
reasonable expectation of privacy is implicated.”108 The prerequisites
include:
(1) the judge issuing the warrant must find that ‘normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous,’ (2) the warrant must contain a ‘particular description
of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a
statement of the particular offense to which it relates,’ (3) the
warrant must not allow the period of interception to be ‘longer than
is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization . . . or in
any event longer than thirty days’ (though extensions are possible,
and (4) the warrant must require that the interception ‘be
connected in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under [Title
III].’109

Essentially, these prerequisites mirror the federal statute governing
electronic surveillance and follow the approach set out by the Second,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, respectively.110 Ultimately, the
defendant’s attempt to exclude the pole camera surveillance was
successful since the government did not follow the above requirements.111
2. The Tenth Circuit
In United States v. Jackson, law enforcement suspected the
defendants of being involved in a crack distribution ring.112 To confirm
their suspicions, the FBI and local police set up pole cameras to surveil the
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Id.
Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 252.
109 Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 252. (internal citations omitted); see also 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–2522.
110 Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 252.
111 Id.
112 United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds,
531 U.S. 1033 (2000).
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defendants’ residential properties.113 Law enforcement had the capability
to adjust the pole cameras from the police station, even so far as to zoom
in close enough to read a license plate.114 But the pole cameras could not
record audio, and did not have the ability to view the interior of the
properties.115
Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Cuevas-Sanchez, the Tenth Circuit
interpreted Ciraolo broadly. The Tenth Circuit found that the camera
investigation did not require a search warrant because the defendants did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.116 Here, however, the pole
cameras observed only what any passerby would easily observe.117
The Tenth Circuit distinguished previous decisions that the
defendants relied on. Specifically, the court noted that United States v.
Mesa-Rincon118 and United States v. Torres119 were inapplicable because
“reasonable expectations of privacy were implicated in each.”120 In
making its decision, the court relied upon the proposition that “aerial
observation of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a home without
a warrant, does not violate the Fourth Amendment,” and aligned itself with
the analysis established by the Supreme Court in Ciraolo.121
B. Statutory Concerns – The Federal Wiretap Statute (“Title III”)
Currently, Title III is inapplicable to video surveillance.122
Nevertheless, a majority of the circuits have applied some of the higher
constitutional standards of Title III to video surveillance warrants, such as
necessity and minimization.123 Title III instructs law enforcement to
“conduct the surveillance in such a manner as to ‘minimize’ the

113

Id. at 1276.
Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1280–81.
117 Id. at 1280.
118 United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990).
119 United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).
120 Jackson, 213 F.3d at 1280; Mesa-Rincon, supra, 911 F.2d at1438 (discussing a
warehouse-like building interior); Torres, supra, 751 F.2d at 876-878 (discussing a terrorist
safehouse).
121 Jackson, 213 F.3d at 1280–81.
122 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
123 United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing an apartment interior);
United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (discussing a business
office interior); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing
a warehouse-like building interior); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez (5th Cir. 1987)
(discussing a backyard); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing
a private business office); Torres, supra, 751 F.2d 875 (discussing a terrorist safehouse);
cf. United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing an office interior).
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interception” of non-relevant conversations.124 Thus, minimization is a
question of reasonableness and depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case.125
In United States v. Koyomejian, law enforcement filed applications,
supported by proper affidavits, in the district court to install hidden
microphones and silent closed circuit television cameras (“CCTVs”)
inside one of the defendant’s offices.126 The district court granted the
government’s applications and the surveillance produced silent videotapes
of multiple defendants “receiving, counting, and packaging large amounts
of cash.”127 The Ninth Circuit confronted the question of what effect Title
III128 and the Foreign Intelligence Act (“FISA”) had on silent video
surveillance conducted for purely domestic purposes.129 The Ninth Circuit
found that, by the plain meaning of the words in Title III, as well as prior
case law and legislative history, their definitions did not apply to silent
video surveillance.130 The district court recognized that the FISA includes
a broad provision for “electronic surveillance,” but stated that it does not
apply to “surveillance conducted for purely domestic purposes.”131
While the Ninth Circuit found that Title III and FISA did not regulate
or prohibit silent video surveillance undertaken for domestic purposes, it
noted that the Fourth Amendment governs such surveillance.132 The court
concluded that Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes a district court to issue warrants for silent video surveillance.133
The court further noted that, following other circuits that have ruled on
this issue, it was necessary to look to Title III for guidance in
“implementing the Fourth Amendment in an area that Title III does not
specifically cover.”134
Along with the requirement of a finding of probable cause, the Ninth
Circuit was confident that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were
protected by adopting the following requirements from Title III:
124 United States v. Apodaca, 820 F.2d 348, 350 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139–140 (1978).
125 Id.
126 Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 538.
127 Id.
128 At the time, Title III was known as its predecessor, Title I.
129 Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 538.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 540.
132 Id. at 541–42.
133 Id. at 542; see also United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1436 (10th Cir.
1990) (“Rule 41 is sufficiently flexible to include within its scope electronic intrusions
authorized upon a finding of probable cause.”) (quoting New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
169 (1977)); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 877–78 (7th Cir. 1984).
134 Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 542.
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(1) the judge issuing the warrant must find that “normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous; (2) the warrant must contain “a particular description
of the type of [activity] sought to be [videotaped], and a statement
of the particular offense to which it relates; (3) the warrant must
not allow the period of [surveillance] to be “longer than is
necessary to achieve the objective of authorization, or in any event
longer than thirty days” (though extensions are possible); and (4)
the warrant must require that the [surveillance] “be conducted in
such a way as to minimize the [videotaping] of [activity] not
otherwise subject to [surveillance] . . . 135

The Eighth Circuit addressed a similar issue in United States v.
Falls.136 Similar to Koyomejian, law enforcement filed applications in the
district court, supported by proper affidavits, to authorize silent CCTV
surveillance of portions of the interior of one of the defendants’
apartments, as well as for a traditional “bug” to intercept oral
communications.137 The court granted the application and the government
subsequently engaged in both electronic oral surveillance and silent video
surveillance of the defendant’s apartment.138
The Eighth Circuit concluded that district courts “have the power to
authorize silent video surveillance” where there is compliance with the
Fourth Amendment.139 Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit
adopted the “same standard of review for an application to engage in nonaudio video surveillance as we apply to wiretap applications [as set forth
in Title III], which is the same standard that we apply to conventional
warrants.”140 The court noted that it was “clear that silent video
surveillance . . . results in a very serious, some say Orwellian, invasion of
privacy.”141
In alignment with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit
came to a similar finding when confronted with video surveillance.142 In
United States v. Williams, defendants were involved in a decades long
gambling operation.143 The government initially conducted investigations

135 Id. (citing United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1987); see
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522.
136 United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 683.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 683; see also United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (1984).
142 United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 1997).
143 Id. at 414–15.
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using a confidential informant and physical surveillance.144 Defendants
did not challenge Title III or the relevant state wiretapping statute, but
instead argued that the video surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment
and the resulting video evidence should have been suppressed.145
The defendants contended that the video surveillance was
“unreasonable” because of the nature of the crimes under investigation. 146
The Third Circuit noted that other circuit courts that have addressed video
surveillance have held that “video surveillance conforming to the
standards set out in Title III is constitutional.” 147 The court found no case
suggesting that the application of these standards depends upon the nature
of the crimes under investigation. 148 As a result, the Third Circuit flatly
rejected defendants’ argument. 149
The defendants further argued that the video surveillance “failed to
meet Title III’s requirement that ‘normal investigative procedures have
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed
if tried or are too dangerous.’” 150 The Third Circuit noted that the courts
have consistently held in Title III cases that the government is not required
to exhaust all other investigative procedures, but rather it is sufficient that
there is evidence that “normal investigative techniques . . . reasonably
appear to be unlucky to succeed if tried.” 151 The government is only
required to lay a “factual predicate sufficient to inform the judge why other
methods of investigation are not sufficient.” 152 In determining whether
this has been satisfied, a court “may properly take into account
affirmations which are founded in part upon the experience of specially
trained agents.” 153
The Third Circuit found no reason as to why the rules developed in
previous video surveillance cases should not be applied in that case as
well. 154 The court reviewed Falls and Mesa-Rincon, and concluded that
“audio surveillance alone was not likely to disclose the identities of all of
the participants and what they were doing.” 155 The Third Circuit noted
that while it would not be advisable to use the application as a model in

144
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147
148
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151
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Id. at 416–18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 417.
Williams, 124 F.3d at 417–18.
Id.
Id. at 418.
Id.
Id. at 418–20.
Id.
Williams, 124 F.3d at 418–20.
Id.
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future cases, it still satisfied constitutional requirements under the Fourth
Amendment. 156
IV. ANALYSIS
A. California v. Ciraolo Must be Broadly Interpreted in Order to
Comport with Fourth Amendment Protections
The Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have applied Ciraolo
differently in video surveillance cases.157 But the Tenth Circuit’s broad
interpretation of Ciraolo best comports with constitutional and policy
concerns. Additionally, the broad interpretation of Ciraolo produces the
same result under both trespass and privacy theories.
The Fifth Circuit has distinguished Ciraolo and has viewed video
surveillance differently than aerial surveillance.158 Specifically, the Fifth
Circuit opined that video surveillance is not a minimal intrusion or a “onetime overhead flight or a glance over the fence by a passerby.”159
Accordingly, the court interpreted Ciraolo as not permitting any type of
surveillance solely because “one type of minimally intrusive aerial
observation is possible.” 160 This interpretation of Ciraolo is too narrow,
and seems to disregard how the Supreme Court has historically addressed
different types of technological advancements in the past.161
To contrast, the Tenth Circuit takes a more practical approach by
broadly interpreting Ciraolo.162 The Tenth Circuit posited that “the Fourth
Amendment protection has never extended to require law enforcement to
shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.” 163
This also aligns itself with the Supreme Court’s approach in cases
subsequent to Ciraolo. For example, this approach comports with the
Supreme Court’s approaches in Florida v. Riley and Florida v. Jardines.164
Therefore, looking to the cases that followed and clarified Ciraolo, video
surveillance would be permissible as long as “intimate details” which were
connected with the use of the home or curtilage were not observed and as
long as the video surveillance was not “physically intrusive.”165
156

Id. at 420.
United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds,
531 U.S. 1033 (2000); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987).
158 Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See supra, Point II.
162 Jackson, 213 F.2d 1269.
163 Id. at 280–81 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1985)).
164 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
165 Jackson, 213 F.2d at 280–81.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s broad
interpretation of Ciraolo. While video surveillance is similar to aerial
observation, it is a less intrusive method than flying an airplane or
helicopter over an individual’s home. This broad interpretation of Ciraolo
lends itself to a better constitutional analysis. This interpretation of
Ciraolo is also in alignment with past Supreme Court rulings regarding
other technological advancements.166
Additionally, the same results are produced regardless of whether the
trespass or privacy theory is applied to video surveillance. Prior to its
decision in Katz, the Supreme Court analyzed Fourth Amendment issues
solely under the trespass theory.167 The trespass theory examines “the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”168
For example, it is permissible for the government to place a listening
device that would allow audio surveillance of a suspect, as long as the
government did not physically intrude on the suspect’s apartment, under
the trespass theory.169 There is no problem for law enforcement if there is
no trespass.170 This reasoning is akin to the false friend concept – where
someone that you know and trust, unbeknownst to you, is cooperating with
the government or is wired in some way.171 The Supreme Court has held
that information revealed from a false friend relationship is consensual,
and thus non-trespassory.172
As technology advanced, it became less necessary for law
enforcement to physically intrude with regard to investigative techniques.
The trespass theory, coupled with new technology, no longer supported
the Founding Fathers’ visions. Due to underlying discomfort with the
trespass theory, the Supreme Court adopted the privacy theory in Katz.
The privacy theory encompasses the two-part Katz test, with the
underlying theory being that “the Fourth Amendment protects people not
places.”173 Even under Katz, the “false friend” relationship is still
permissible. There is no distinction between a “tattletale” and a
“transistor,” and it is not reasonable to expect privacy when you
voluntarily tell a third party.174
Technology continued to advance in a post 9/11 reality, which have
impacted an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” The
166
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170
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See supra, Point II.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Id.; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
Id.
Id.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
Id.; White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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privacy theory remained the prevailing standard until United States v.
Jones.175 For the first time since 1967, the trespass theory prevailed.176
Justice Scalia proposed the trespass theory as an alternative theory, instead
of a replacement for the privacy theory, with the belief that it would
breathe life back into the Fourth Amendment.177
In the following year in Florida v. Jardines, Justice Scalia cemented
his support of the trespass theory, where he reiterated that society expects
visitors to come up to your door as part of implied license. 178 Importantly,
what the police officer did in Jardines exceeded the scope of that license
because he was accompanied with a drug sniffing dog to investigate an
unverified anonymous tip.179 The fact that trespass has returned in recent
years does not eradicate the privacy theory. California v. Ciraolo and
Florida v. Riley are prime examples of this. Since trespass was not found
in either case, aerial surveillance without a warrant was permissible under
the Fourth Amendment.
Looking first to the privacy theory, courts must examine the two-part
Katz test. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “people not places” are
protected.180 Thus, courts would not afford backyards such protections
since a backyard is obviously not a person. The courts will need to
determine the first prong on a case-by-case basis, depending on what an
individual did to “shield” her backyard from passersby.181 Clearly, a sixfoot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence and a greenhouse were not
enough to satisfy the Katz test.182 Consequently, a defendant would have
to do something fairly extreme to assert that she manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy. Significantly, the second prong of the Katz test
will consistently fail with regard to video and pole camera surveillance.
There can be no expectation of privacy found in an area that an individual
voluntarily exposes to the public.
Looking next to the trespass theory, the answer is even clearer.
Video surveillance does not constitute a physical intrusion upon an
individual or her property. Law enforcement never physically intrudes
upon a defendant’s property, but rather the video cameras are installed
outside of the residence. The video cameras only provide police with a
“better view.” It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment does not
175

United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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177 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
178 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013).
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prohibit law enforcement from “augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and
technology afforded them.”183 A video camera is arguably less intrusive
than an airplane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet or a helicopter flying at
an altitude of 400 feet.184 This is clearly distinguishable from attaching a
GPS device to the undercarriage of a vehicle, where there is an actual
invasion of the physicality of the vehicle.185 Thus, video surveillance is
permissible under both the trespass and privacy theory approaches.
B. The Federal Wiretap Act (“Title III”) Must be Amended to
Encompass Video Surveillance
For consistency in case law and to produce guidelines for law
enforcement to abide by, the legislature should amend Title III to
specifically encompass video surveillance. Presently, Title III only
governs wire, oral, and electronic surveillance methods.186 Title III is
silent as to video surveillance, and thus inapplicable. While the majority
of the circuit courts have already adopted some of the requirements of Title
III into case law, it is not enough.
The legislature should amend Title III to include video surveillance,
so that the Title III analysis and Fourth Amendment analysis can be
conflated into one category. The analysis should not automatically be void
and go directly to the Fourth Amendment analysis. Currently, the circuit
courts agree that while Title III is inapplicable to silent video camera
surveillance, some of the guidelines under Title III apply to the Fourth
Amendment analysis of such surveillance.187 Specifically, the circuits
seem to agree that the certain requirements of Title III should apply. First,
the judge issuing the warrant is required to find that “normal investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.188 Next, the warrant
must contain “a particular description of the type of communication sought
to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates.”189 The warrant also must not permit the period of surveillance to
be “longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization,
or in any event longer than thirty days.”190 However, extensions for a
183
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longer period of surveillance may be permitted under certain
circumstances.191 Finally, the warrant must require that the surveillance
“be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception” under Title III.192
Specific guidelines would also minimize challenges made by
defendants. Since Title III does not currently address video surveillance,
there is room for interpretation. If video surveillance is explicitly
mentioned within Title III, courts will easily be able to apply the analysis
that they have essentially been construing to be applicable regardless.
Even if Title III is not amended, case law clearly suggests that analysis
under the Fourth Amendment will produce a nearly identical inquiry.
C. Future Concerns with New Surveillance Methods and Other
Technological Advancements
Various methods of surveillance have undergone dramatic
technological advancements and these methods will continue to develop
in the future. In particular, drones are quickly emerging as a new
surveillance technology. A drone, also known as an unmanned aerial
system (“UAS”), is an unmanned aircraft with “all of the associated
support equipment, control station, data links, telemetry, and
communications and navigation equipment” necessary to operate the
unmanned aircraft.193 The unmanned aircraft is the flying portion of the
system, flown by a pilot via a ground control system or by an on-board
computer.194 A UAS can range from as large as a Boeing 737 to as small
as a radio-controlled model airplane.195
By virtue of its definition, a drone is an extension of aerial
surveillance conducted by large airplanes. The view from a drone is
similar to that of an airplane overhead or arguably, the view from a pole
camera. Drones are certainly an example of when the courts will need to
set certain parameters for permissible use by law enforcement.
Legislation regarding drone usage by law enforcement has been
limited on the federal level. Currently, there is a ban on commercial drone
flights.196 But certain public entities such as publically funded
universities, law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and other
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government agencies, can apply to the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”) for a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (“COA”) to utilize
drones in public aircraft operations.197 Public aircraft operations are
permitted only for a government function.198 COAs are issued for a
specific timespan, which is typically two years, and include special
provisions that are individualized to each proposal, such as the defined
block of airspace and the time of day that the drone can be used.199 While
the average COA processing time is usually less than sixty days, expedited
authorization is available in emergency and life-threatening situations.200
As drones continue to increase in popularity, they will undoubtedly
become more prominent for use by law enforcement. Drones provide not
only “real time situational awareness” but also help to increase officer
safety.201 Certain law enforcement agencies already utilize drones for uses
that include, but are not limited to, tactical operations, fire investigations
and assessments, criminal pursuits, forensics, accident investigations,
crime scene investigations, gathering evidence, searches and rescues,
narcotics investigations, and suspect and vehicle tracking.202
Due to the lack of clear regulations regarding drone usage, law
enforcement agencies have little to no guidelines to follow. Since drones
are akin to pole cameras and aerial surveillance methods, the same Fourth
Amendment analysis should be followed. Therefore, it is essential to have
a consistent and clear Fourth Amendment analysis for law enforcement to
abide by.
V. CONCLUSION
While the text of the Fourth Amendment has remained the same,
technologies continue to advance beyond the anticipated parameters of the
original text. Although video surveillance does not typically present
constitutional or statutory problems in most scenarios, it is essential to
address the areas that clearly are not attached to a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Notably, pole cameras do not allow law enforcement to
observe anything more than a utility worker would observe if he was
performing job-related duties atop a pole. 203 This is significant because,
197
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if a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist, the Fourth
Amendment does not apply.204
While the Supreme Court has not been completely silent as to the
general topic of video surveillance, it needs to provide a clear framework
that can be applied to emerging technologies and new methods of
surveillance, while simultaneously complying with the Fourth
Amendment. As such, the Court must adopt the broad interpretation of
Ciraolo. This interpretation lends itself to comporting with the analysis of
similar technological advancements and produces the same result under
both trespass and privacy theories.
Additionally, even though Title III provides the statutory framework
that governs real-time electronic surveillance, it is currently inapplicable
to video surveillance. Accordingly, Title III must be amended by the
legislature to include video surveillance. Such an amendment would allow
for consistency throughout the federal circuit courts. But even if the
legislature does not amend Title III, case law clearly suggests that Fourth
Amendment analysis should be applied regardless, producing the same
result as if Title III was amended.
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